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Abstract
The introduction of income taxation was a landmark in the development of the
scal state in Western Europe and elsewhere. This paper presents an event history
study of the adoption of the income tax in 11 Western European countries between
1815 and 1941. We nd evidence that social learning, reductions in tax collection
costs and to a lesser extend spending pressures played a signicant role for the
adoption decision. Surprisingly, we also nd evidence that the extension of the
franchise reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax.
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1 Introduction
In 2006 more than 30 percent of total tax revenue derived from the personal income tax
in the United Kingdom; in the years after it was rst introduced in 1842, the yield was
less than half of that. During the intervening 164 years, the income tax, not only in
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the United Kingdom, but in all advanced democratic societies moved from the margins
to the center of the scal state. The decision, by Western European states, to add the
income tax to the arsenal of revenue raising instruments spanned almost a century. The
rst country to introduce a national-wide personal income tax was the United Kingdom in
1842; the last country to introduce a nation-wide (federal) income tax was Switzerland in
1941. In between these extremes, other European countries gradually introduced taxation
of personal incomes.
One of the classical questions in public nance concerns the sources of growth in gov-
ernment? Research on this question has been motivated by the observation that the size
of government however measured has increased dramatically in proportion to the economy
in virtually all countries which are now considered part of the developed world (see, e.g.,
Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). The stylized pattern followed by most of these countries
suggests that growth in government can be divided into four phases: i) moderate growth
before World War I, ii) level shift in the interwar period; iii) rapid growth starting in
the 1960s with iv) a plateau being reached in the late 1980s. A variety of economic and
political explanations has been advanced to explain this pattern, but without reaching
rm conclusions (see, e.g., Lindert, 2004a,b). One important idea, pushed for example
by Becker and Mulligan (2003), is that e¢ cient taxes are behind big government. If so,
this begs a deeper question, namely what causes a society to innovate and adopt e¢ cient
taxes? The income tax is arguably one of the most important tax innovations of the past
150 years, only rivalled by value added tax. Gaining a better understanding of how and
why it came into being would therefore provide another important stepping stone towards
a better understanding of the sources of growth in government.
The purpose of this paper is to study the factors behind the di¤erences in the timing
of the income tax across Western European states. We are interested in four potential
causes or reasons for delaying or adopting the income tax. The rst set of reasons are
related to political factors such as the extension of the franchise, the degree of political
competition, and the importance of left-wing parties. The second set of reasons relates
to the possibility of social learning or spatial di¤usion, i.e., the idea that late adopters
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observe the results achieved by early adopters and base their adoption decision on this.
The third set of reason relates to tax collection technology, while the fourth set relates to
wars and other pressures on the public purse.
There exists plenty of circumstantial evidence that these factors mattered for the de-
cision to adopt the income tax. Peters (1991, p. 231), for example, argues that "with
the extension of the franchise and the birth of labor movements and socialist parties came
demands for greater redistribution through the tax system, and particularly for greater use
of income and prot taxation to raise the needed revenues for increasingly active govern-
ments." At the same time, there is also much anecdotal evidence that politicians aiming
at introducing an income tax at home took notice of what happened abroad. For example,
the Austrian income tax introduced in 1849 was explicitly modelled on the English income
tax (Sieghart, 1898). In France the repeated, but unsuccessful, attempts to introduce an
income tax throughout the later part of the nineteenth century took much of its inspiration
from Prussia and England.1 Likewise, when Britain introduced the income tax in 1842,
many Dutch politicians were inspired and a rst proposal was made in parliament at that
time. The minister responsible was, however, forced to resign and it was not until 1893
that the income tax was nally adopted in the Netherlands (Smit, 2002). Tax collection
costs are also believed to matter by many authors. These include Riezman and Slemrod
(1987) who view falling tax collection costs as one of the root causes of tax innovations.
Moreover, economic history is littered with examples of early attempts to introduce income
taxation that subsequently failed because of the lack of scal capacity to extract su¢ cient
yields.2 Finally, the fact that European countries ever since the Napoleonic Wars had
resorted to temporary taxation of incomes in times of scal need strongly suggests that
scal pressures might have played a key role in spreading income taxation across Europe
during the nineteenth century.
1In 1893, for example, three income tax proposals were discussed. The rst was simply an extension
of the personal property tax (contribution personnelle et mobilière). The second was one based on the
Prussian model of a lump-sum income tax (impôt global or impôt sur le revenu). The third was the
stoppage-at-source (PAYE) income tax based on the English model, known as the impôt cédulaire or the
impôt sur les revenue (Seligman, 1911, Chapter 2; Willis, 1895).
2One example is the income tax introduced in 1809-10 in Sweden which was given up in 1812 because
of low yields (see Philip, 1965, chapter 9, which contains additional examples).
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To quantify the importance of these factors, we o¤er an event history study of the timing
of the adoption of lasting income taxation by the national governments of 11 Western
European countries from 1815 to 1941. The idea is to model the (conditional) probability
that a country which has not yet adopted the income tax adopts it in a given year as a
function of the four factors outlined above. To this end, we estimate a duration model that
allows for a time varying hazard rate and unobserved heterogeneity. We nd evidence that
social learning, reductions in tax collection costs and to a lesser extent spending pressures
played a signicant role for the adoption decision. Surprisingly, we also nd evidence that
the extension of the franchise reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax.
The paper is related to a growing literature on the historical roots of the scal state.
Boix (2003), Lindert (2004a,b), Aidt et al. (2006), Aidt and Jensen (2007) and others
report quantitative evidence on the factors that drove tax and spending levels as well as
the composition of the public budget during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Lindert (1994) studies the factors that triggered the introduction of social spending pro-
grams before 1930.3 Our study di¤ers from these in that it, to the best of our knowledge,
is the rst to apply event history techniques to study the historical origins of the income
tax in a non-US context. Event study techniques are frequently used to study the fac-
tors that lead governments to adopt new policies in contemporaneous societies4 as well as
historically5 and our paper builds on a well-established methodology (e.g., Walker, 1969;
Berry and Berry, 1992). It is directly related to a small literature on tax innovations.
Building on Hansen (1983) and Berry (1988), Berry and Berry (1992) study the timing
of new taxes, related to income and gasoline, among US states during various sub-periods
of the twentieth century. They report evidence that states were less likely to adopt an
income tax in election years and more likely to adopt it if the state legislature was con-
3There is also a related literature on the development of the scal state after the Second World War.
This includes among others Peltzman (1980), Reizman and Slemrod (1987), Kau and Rubin (1987), Husted
and Kenny (1997), Rodrik (1998), Boix (2001), Becker and Mulligan (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2003),
Kenny and Winer (2006) and Dusek (2006).
4Some examples are Berry and Berry (1990), who study adoption of state lotteries in the US, and
Canon and Baum (1981), who study adoption of tort law innovations among US states.
5Meissner (2005), for example, studies the di¤usion of the gold standard between 1870-1913 in a sample
of 24 countries.
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trolled by a liberal party.6 Evidence from outside US states is more scarce, largely because
tax innovations are relatively rare events. One exception is Ashworth et al. (2006) who
study the adoption of environmental taxes among Flemish municipalities in the 1990s.
They also nd evidence that adoptions are less likely in election years and more likely
when the municipality is controlled by a left-wing party. In addition, they nd evidence
of social learning in that the likelihood of adoption in a particular municipality increases
if its neighbors (both geographically and ideologically) have adopted in the past. We
shall comment in more detail on these ndings when we discuss our results in Section 5. A
virtue of our setting relative to the previous studies is that it spans a period of time during
which major political reforms took place. This allows us to investigate, for the rst time,
the role of institutional reform, such as the extension of the franchise, on tax innovations.
One problem, however, is that tax adoption decisions are not made against the backdrop
of a common institutional framework, as in the case of states or municipalities; another
problem is that we observe relatively few innovations (11) spread over a long period of
time (99 years). To deal with the former problem, we pay special attention to unobserved
heterogeneity and report results that allow for random e¤ects as well as some instrumental
variable estimates. To deal with the latter problem, we report results that correct for the
bias that arises when events are rare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief history
of income taxation in Western Europe. In section 3, we introduce and formulate the hy-
potheses to be tested and discuss how to measure the four sets of potential determinants
of the decision to introduce the income tax. In section 4, we set out the empirical strat-
egy. In section 5, we report the main results and consider various strategies to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity and rare events. In section 6, we conclude. The data appendix
at the end discusses the construction of the data set and its sources and provides a very
brief history of income taxation in the 11 countries in our sample.
6Democrats are assumed "liberal" except in the Southern states where they are assumed "conservative".
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2 Income Taxation in Western Europe
At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the scal states of Western Europe still relied
heavily on indirect taxes, such as customs and excise duties, for revenues, supplemented
with land and inheritance taxes. But things were starting to change with signicant
ramications for the development of the scal state. Forced by the need to raise revenues
to nance the war against the French, an income tax was introduced in Britain in 1799.7
It had most of the attributes of the modern income tax: citizens had to le a yearly tax
return stating gross income from all sources which were then taxed at 10 per cent with
an allowance for deduction of certain expenses, children and payments to life insurance.
The tax was, however, repealed in 1802, but reintroduced in the following year when war
broke out again. Other countries, including the Nordic countries, France, and some of the
German states, also experimented with income taxation during the Napoleonic Wars, but
only temporarily. The rst country in Europe to make the income tax, understood as a tax
on earned income,8 a lasting feature of the tax system was Britain in 1842.9 It was soon
after followed by the Austria Empire in 184910 and eventually by 1941, when Switzerland
introduced a federal income tax, all the countries in our sample (listed in Table 1) had a
permanent income tax levied by the central or federal government. The precise years of
adoption are reported in Table 1 along with information about temporary income taxes
and income taxes levied by local government or by states within a federation. We also list
the (approximate) year in which the revenue yield of the income tax reached ve percent of
total revenue. We interpret this as a measure of how important a contribution the income
tax made to the scal capacity of the state. For most countries, the ve percent threshold
was reached shortly after the adoption, but there are signicant exceptions. In Austria,
where an income tax modelled in part on the English income tax (with di¤erent schedules)
7See Daunton (2001, chapter 1 and 4) for a detailed analysis of the income tax in the United Kingdom.
8Various "proxy" taxes, such as wealth taxes, window taxes and property taxes, partly aimed at taxes
something correlated with income, were widely used. These taxes are not part of our denition of income
taxation.
9Although the tax was initially introduced as a temporary measure to replace revenues lost by the
repeal of the Corn Laws and had to be approved by annual votes in Parliament, it persisted all attempts
to abolish it (Peters, 1991, chapter 7).
10See Sieghart (1898).
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was introduced in 1849, the yields stayed below ve percent until 1905.
<Table 1: The timing of the income tax in Western Europe.>
As is clear from the Table, most countries experimented with temporary income taxes
during periods of war or nancial crisis and some federal countries, notably Germany
and Switzerland, had income taxation at the state level long before it was added to the
toolkit of central government (Seligman, 1911). Likewise, some form of income taxation
at the municipality level was common in the Nordic countries long before nation-wide
income taxes were introduced (Philip, 1965).11 It is therefore important to stress that we
mainly focus on the timing of the adoption of a permanent income tax levied by central
government, although we for completeness also report some results for specications in
which we model both permanent and temporary income tax adoptions.
3 The Main Hypotheses
It is clear from Table 1 that the income tax was gradually added to the scal toolbox
in the years following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. We want to understand what
explains the timing of the adoption of the income tax by studying its di¤usion across
Europe. To x ideas, it is useful to develop a simple theoretical framework. Consider
a risk neutral country, indexed by i, which has not yet at time t adopted the income
tax. Let Bit(:) be the expected present value of the benet of adoption. The benets
include diversication gains that arise because the same revenues when raised with more
tax instruments can be collected at lower economic and political cost and an expansion
gain that arises because more revenues can be raised at the same cost (see, e.g., Ashworth
et al., 2005). The present value of the cost of adoption as perceived at time t, denoted
Cit(:), includes the xed cost of adoption as well as the variable costs of tax collection
once the tax has been introduced. We can think of these costs and benets as being partly
11This has caused a certain amount of confusion in the literature about the dating of the income tax as
authors are not always explicit neither about whether the income tax is lasting or temporary nor about
the level at which it is levied. We have checked the dates recorded in Table 1 against multiple sources
including national encyclopaedia. The Data Appendix provides a concise history of income taxation in
each country and lists the sources used to date the adoption.
7
political (e.g., lost or gained popularity) and partly economic (e.g., the deadweight and
administrative costs or the benets of being able to nance new spending programs). Under
democratic rule, for example, political parties would factor the electoral consequences of
new taxes into their adoption decision, while autocratic rulers might be more concerned
with the consequences for regime stability.12 As stressed by Winer and Hettich (1991),
the economic costs and benets of adopting new taxes depends on the entire scal system,
including the availability of alternative tax bases, how hard these bases are pushed to raise
revenues, what the revenue needs are and so on.
Each period there is a random shock to the cost of adoption "it. It is independently
distributed across time and space with E ("it) = 0 and distribution function F . The shock
is observed before the adoption decision is made. Given that, the country adopts at time
t if
Bit (Pit; Sit; Lit)  Cit (Sit; Tit; Lit)  "it (1)
and the probability of adoption at time t given that adoption has not yet happened is then
given by
pA (Pit; Lit; Sit; Tit) = F ("it  Bit (:)  Cit (:)): (2)
The (conditional) probability of adoption, pA, depends on four main factors.
Political institutions and politics [P]. The decision to adopt or not is ltered through
the political institutions in place in the country at the time. The costs and benets of
adoption are, therefore, a¤ected not only by the constituency of government and the party
composition of parliament, but also by how easy it is to contest political power by di¤erent
factions in society. Given that the income tax is a potentially powerful tool for redistri-
bution and that a broader franchise lowers the income of the decisive voters, the benets
of adoption should be higher under universal than under restricted su¤rage. Moreover,
as the constituency of government expands (as a consequence of su¤rage reforms), it be-
comes more attractive for governments to provide public goods. This creates a need for
12Hettich and Winer (1988, 1999) and Ashworth et al. (2006) develop a simple framework for analysing
tax innovations within the context of a competitive democratic system which is useful for conceptualising
some of these e¤ects.
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extra revenues. We, therefore, expect that the extension of the voting franchise (to poorer
citizens) increases the probability that the income tax is adopted:13
Hypothesis 1 The extension of the franchise makes adoption of the income tax more
likely.
Arguably, the newly enfranchised citizens need representation in parliament to make
their demands heard. Left-wing parties, in particular, are likely to have played an im-
portant role in the propagation of income taxation in Europe as they have been found to
do in other contexts (Berry and Berry, 1992; Ashworth, 2006).14 For left-wing parties the
benet of new tax instruments is relatively high because they represent constituencies that
favor more spending. The political cost of adoption might also be relatively low because
many of their voters would not, at least initially, pay income tax. We therefore conjecture
that:
Hypothesis 2 The income tax is more likely to be adopted under left-wing government.
In societies with regular democratic elections, there is ample evidence that politicians
time scal decisions within the election cycle to maximize the chance of reelection.15 Insofar
as new taxes are unpopular with at least some segments of the voter population, politicians
looking to minimize the political cost of a tax innovation are least likely to adopt it
immediately before an election and most likely to do it immediately after an election. As
pointed out by Berry and Berry (1992, p. 719) "such timing would give the public the
maximum amount of time to forget the governments unpopular action before the next
election". We, therefore, expect
13Theoretical work by Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggests a positive link between franchise reform
and redistribution. The survey by Tridimas and Winer (2005) discusses of franchise reform within the
framework of the probabilistic voting model and reach a similar conclusion. The CGE simulations of
Winer and Rutherford (1993), however, cast some doubt on how big a scal expansion franchise extension
causes in practice.
14There is also substantial evidence that left-wing parties played an important role in building welfare
states in Western democracies after the Second World War (see, e.g., Hicks and Swank, 1992; or Blais et
al., 1993).
15See, for example, the survey by Paldam (1997).
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Hypothesis 3 The income tax is less likely to be adopted in election years and more likely
to be adopted the longer there is to the next election.
Another important political factor that might have inuenced the decision to adopt the
income tax is the degree of political competition. By political competition, we mean the
extent to which political power can be contested by organized factions and the executive
can be held accountable by parliament and/or voters. Enhanced political competition
can a¤ect the adoption probability through a number of competing channels. Firstly, it
may increase the probability of adoption because it forces political parties to innovate
and to seek new and more e¤ective ways of raising revenues.16 Secondly, by allowing
power to be more freely contested, enhanced political competition may lead to government
fragmentation. This can lead to grid-lock and be an obstacle for tax innovations. Thirdly,
compared to an autocracy or a restricted democracy, a fully competitive political system
may increase political uncertainty (and government turnover). This may shorten the time
horizon of politicians. Insofar as a large fraction of the cost of adoption is paid up front
and the benets arrive later, this could cause a myopic bias against adopting new taxes.
Overall, a priori political competition has an ambiguous e¤ect.
Social learning and geographical di¤usion [L] A country with no experience with
the income tax might look to neighboring countries, which has already adopted the tax,
to learn about its e¤ectiveness in terms of raising revenues and about the administra-
tive procedures and costs needed to implement it (Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 1992).
Looking at successful adoptions in neighboring countries can reduce some of the uncer-
tainties surrounding the costs and the benets of adoption. Insofar as successful adoption
in neighboring countries demonstrates the revenue potential of the income tax, the benet
of adoption should increase in country i. Likewise, if the adoption elsewhere demonstrates
cost e¤ectiveness or introduces a particular innovation in tax collection technology country
i should revise its cost estimate downwards. Taken together, these information externali-
ties suggest that
16Fundamentally, this hypothesis derives from the belief that political competition is e¢ ciency enhanc-
ing. For theoretical work supporting this idea, see, e.g., Wittman (1989).
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Hypothesis 4 The income tax is more likely to be adopted in a particular country if other
countries have already introduced the tax.
It seems clear that a successful (permanent) adoption of the income tax in one country
may send a strong (positive) signal to neighboring countries about the costs and benets of
income taxation. However, countries may also learn from temporary, and therefore in some
sense unsuccessful, adoptions in other countries. The information content in observing a
temporary adoption is, however, likely to be very di¤erent. One may, in fact, conjecture
that temporary adoptions may have a negative e¤ect on the likelihood that neighboring
countries adopt: the fact that the tax was given up again suggests that the benet did not
exceed the cost after all.
Tax collection costs [T]. Compared to trade taxes and taxes on property, the income
tax is complex to administer and di¢ cult to collect. While, for example, a tari¤ can be
collected at ports by a small number of educated civil servants, income taxes require the
participation of a large number of educated people, who can ll in complex tax returns, and
require a large bureaucracy to administer (Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Kenny and Winer,
2006). The cost of taxing incomes as they are earned is reduced when taxpayers acquire
the skills needed to handle tax returns and the tax administration develops the capacity
to audit and collect complex, broad-based taxes. The development of formal markets and
adoption of modern accounting systems are also important factors. We expect that:
Hypothesis 5 Improvements in the tax collection technology increase the probability that
the income tax is adopted.
Spending pressures [S]. The doctrine of a balanced budget was rigorously applied
throughout the nineteenth century and was e¤ectively the framework for public nances
in Western European societies till after the Second World War when Keynesian ideas of
deliberately unbalanced budgets became generally accepted (Webber andWildavsky, 1986,
chapters 6 and 8). In fact, with the possible exception of Italy and Germany, the norm
of balance was so widely accepted that when governments began to spend proportionately
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larger amounts on social programs and arms, they had to nd new taxes to nance these
expenses to maintain balance. Mounting spending pressures, e.g., triggered by wars or
other types of scal crises decrease the risk of adopting new taxes. We can summarize
what Berry and Berry (1992) call the scal health hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 6 The income tax is more likely to be adopted in times of scal crisis.
Economic development and the associated changes in demographics and modernization
of society more broadly (Wagner, 1883) also put pressures on the public purse while at
the same time enlarging the potential tax base from which income taxes can be collected.
This makes tax innovations more acceptable to public decision makers and we expect that
Hypothesis 7 The income tax is more likely to be adopted in more developed societies.
To estimate pA, we obviously need suitable variables to represent P , L, T and S.
Table 2 lists the variables that we have chosen for the purpose. The choice is somewhat
constrained by the fact that our analysis starts in 1815. This makes data availability a
problematic issue.
<Table 2: Overview of explanatory variables and mnemonics>
We use ve variables to capture political factors. Our main political variable is su¤rage.
It is a direct measure of the extension of the franchise and records the fraction of the (male)
population that could vote for elections to the lower chamber of parliament and is coded
zero if no elections took place (Flora et al., 1983).17 We also make use of four other
political variables. The rst of these is a variable called left-wing parties. It is an attempt
to capture the importance of left-wing parties in the lower chamber of parliament. It is
measured as the seat share won by left-wing parties (Flora et al., 1983; Caramani, 2000;
Cook and Paxton, 1998). We expect that both of these variables have a positive e¤ect on
the adoption probability. To capture the e¤ect of the election cycle, we use the dummy
17Womens su¤rage was, except in Germany and Belgium, introduced after the adoption of the income
tax (see Aidt and Dallal, 2007). Thus, we do not make any attempt to model this aspect of enfranchise-
ment.
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variable election year. It is equal to 1 in election years and 0 otherwise. We also use the
variable years to next election. It counts the number of years to the next election. The
last variable makes most sense if there are regular elections. We expect a negative e¤ect
of election year and a positive e¤ect of years to next election. We use the variable political
competition to capture institutional reforms that induced more political competition for
control of government and/or imposed more checks on the executive. The variable is equal
to the polity IV index constructed byMarshall and Jaggers (2000).18 The index is measured
on a scale from -10 (little political competition) to 10 (lot of political competition).19 As
discussed above, we do not have a clear prediction regarding this variable.
We use two alternative measures of "positive" social learning. The idea behind both
is that a country that has not yet adopted the income tax is more likely to adopt it if
countries "close" to it has adopted in the past. The two measures di¤er in their denition
of "closeness". Geographical closeness uses the inverse of the distance between the capital
in the country under consideration and that of the other countries which have adopted the
income tax in the past to dene closeness.20 Trade connection uses the extent of bilateral
trade relative to GDP to dene closeness. The later may be theoretically more satisfac-
tory insofar as information about social innovations is transmitted mostly through trade
interactions and is only indirectly related to physical distance. However, trade connection
cannot, due to data limitations, be traced further back in time than 1870. Thus, in the
statistical analysis, we use geographical closeness as the principal measure of (positive)
social learning. We expect a positive e¤ect of both of these variables. To capture that
temporary adoption may also induce social learning, but most likely by giving a negative
signal to surrounding countries, we have, using physical distance between capitals, coded
18The polity IV index summarizes di¤erent indicators of political authority patterns to measure three
key aspects of a countrys political system. The three aspects are: i) competitiveness and openness
in the process of executive recruitment; ii) constraints on the chief executive and iii) competitiveness
and regulation of political participation. A weighted sum of these components is used to construct two
summary variables, measuring democracy on a scale from 0 to 10 and autocracy from -10 to 0. The polity
IV index is the sum of these two sub-indexes.
19See Aidt and Eterovic (2007) for a detailed discussion of the link between the polity IV index and
political competition.
20Walker (1969), Berry and Berry (1992) and Ashworth et al. (2006) use neighboring states to dene
geographical closeness. The geography of Western Europe makes this an uncompelling choice for our
purposes and we prefer to use the capital-to-capital distance instead.
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the variable learning from temporary adoptions.
As argued by Riezman and Slemrod (1987), Kenny and Winer (2006), Aidt and Jensen
(2007) and others, the relative administrative cost of levying income taxes falls as literacy
becomes more widespread. Literacy and basic numerical skills are necessary for ling
tax returns. The spread of these skills in the population, therefore, reduces the cost
of collecting taxes that require individuals and businesses to le a return and to keep
detailed records of their transactions.21 In short, a minimum level of literacy and numeracy
is necessary for successful income taxation. As Riezman and Slemrod (1987, p. 546),
who rst proposed the proxy, point out: it "seems reasonable [that the collection cost
of tari¤s relative to income and sale taxes depends positively on literacy levels] because
operating a tari¤ system requires a small number of educated civil servants, while income
or sales taxation, to function e¤ectively, requires the participation of a large number of
educated people".22 In addition to this, it is necessary to keep track of where individuals
live and work. Accordingly, as more accurate census information becomes available the
administrative cost of income taxation should fall. Finally, experience with either local
income taxation or with temporary nation-wide income taxes, e.g., at times of war helps
build institutional capacities that lower the administrative cost of a permanent adoption.
We have constructed a cost index as described in Table 2 to capture these forces and
expect that an increase in the index (representing a fall in relative tax collection cost) to
increase the probability of adoption. It can be argued that urbanization is another good
proxy for administrative costs (see, e.g., Kenny and Winer, 2006). The idea is that it
is cheaper to collect income taxes in an urban environment. We, therefore, expect that
urbanization increases the probability of adoption. While the constituents of cost index
21These tax returns were complex documents and it was not a simple matter to ll them in. An example
of a tax return from 1887-88 from the United Kingdom can be viewed on http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/
faculty/aidt/papers /papers2.htm.
22There are two other reasons why literacy is a good proxy for the relative administrative cost of income
taxation. Firstly, education is correlated with earnings, and average education attainment provides a
measure of the earnings potential of the population that is independent of the business cycle. Income
taxation is ine¤ective and costly if the vast majority of the population live on subsistence wages. As
education levels improve, more people earn incomes above this level. This, in turn, reduces the cost of
collecting taxes levied on income. Secondly, it is easier (and cheaper) to recruit a well-qualied bureaucracy
in societies with a larger pool of educated individuals. This, in turn, allows the government to build
institutional capacities.
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can be tracked back to 1815, data on the degree of urbanization is not available for the
entire period and, for this reason, urbanization is not one of the constituents of the cost
index and is a somewhat problematic measure of tax collection costs in our context. We
expect a positive e¤ect of both of these variables.
Spending pressures are likely to increase the probability of adoption of the income tax
and can be measured in four alternative ways. Firstly, wars create an acute need for public
nance and many countries introduced temporary income taxes during times of war. We
have coded a dummy variable called war to capture this possibility. Second, economic
development (measured by GDP per capita) and population pressures (measured by the
size of the population) may increase the demand for public goods and other government
services (Wagner, 1883). A larger population also means that there are more shoulders
to bear any xed costs of adoption. Third, ageing of the population (measured as the
percentage of the population above 65 years of age) is another likely contributor to spending
pressures as demands for social security and pensions increase (Lindert, 1994). Finally,
we use a measure of the budget decit, which within the context of a balanced budget
regime becomes a direct measure of spending pressures. While the variables war, GDP
per capita and population cover the entire period from 1815, the variables age structure
and decit cannot be traced further back than 1860 for most countries. We expect that
all these variables have a positive e¤ect on the probability of adoption.
4 Empirical Specication
In our baseline model, we code the dependent variable yit as one if country i adopts the
income tax in year t and zero in the years before that. A country drops out of the sample
when it has adopted the income tax.23 We deal with the problem of left censoring, i.e., the
problem that we do not know precisely when the spell without income taxation starts for
each country, in the following way. We have chosen the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815)
as the point in time when countries that were independent at the time became at "risk" of
23Since we focus on the arrival of lasting income taxation there is, by denition, no issue of "reentry"
of countries that give up the income tax at some future point in time.
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adopting the income tax permanently. The rationale for this is that many countries (e.g.,
the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and France) partly nanced the Napoleonic
Wars by taxing incomes. This establishes beyond any doubt that the technology to do
so existed at that point in time. For countries that were not independent in 1815, we
assume that they become at "risk" of adopting the income tax as soon as they did become
independent.24 All in all, this gives us a data set of up to 642 country-year observations.
Our data are grouped duration data and it is natural to use a duration model to
estimate the relationship between the potential explanatory factors introduced above and
the time conditional probability of adopting the income tax (the hazard rate). Since it is
unlikely that the hazard rate is independent of the tax history of the countries, we allow
and test for duration dependence. We follow Beck et al. (1998) and estimate the following
discrete logistic model:25
P (yit = 1jxit; yit 1 = 0) = 1
1 + e (xit+H(t ti))
where xit is a vector of explanatory factors (chosen from among those listed in Table 2)
and  is the vector of parameters of interest. H(t  ti) is a smooth function of the number
of years a country has been at "risk" of adopting the income tax26 and allow us to model
duration dependence in a exible way and to test the assumption of a constant baseline
hazard rate. We estimate H (:) using natural cubic splines and use the estimated spline
coe¢ cients along with the cumulation of years spend without income taxation to trace out
the path of duration dependence.27
In addition to the baseline model, we estimate two alternative models. Firstly, to
increase the number of events, we have recoded the dependent variable, yit, to take into
account temporary as well as permanent adoptions.28 Secondly, it can be argued that the
24This means that Belgium and the Netherlands enter the data set in 1830; that Switzerland enters in
1848 (when a federal stucture was established); that Italy enters in 1861; and that Germany enters in
1871.
25Beck et al. (2004, Appendix) show that this is the discrete hazard model corresponding to the well-
known continuous time proportional hazard model (Cox, 1975).
26ti representes the year in which country i enters the risk set (i.e., either 1815 or the year of indepen-
dent).
27We have determined the number of knots by a sequence of F-tests and have settled on a specication
with two knots.
28For a country that had, say, one temporary adoption before the income tax was nally adopted for
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income tax is not "really" introduced until it contributes with more than a token to total
tax revenues. To allow for this possibility, we have recoded yit such that the income tax is
"adopted" in the year when the revenue yield exceeds ve percent of total tax revenues.
We have experimented with di¤erent cut-o¤s, but the results are fairly similar, at least
within the range from ve to ten percent of total revenues.
5 The Results
We have divided the discussion of the results into four sub-sections. Firstly, we present
the baseline results. Secondly, we present results that take into account unobserved het-
erogeneity. Thirdly, we present results from specications that model both temporary and
permanent income tax adoptions and results estimated with a statistical technique that
takes into account that tax adoptions are rare events. Fourthly, we report some results
that use the yield-based denition to date the introduction of the income tax.
5.1 The Baseline Results
The main results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The baseline model (1) is relatively
parsimonious and includes only the key variables from each of the four groups of variables
(su¤rage, cost index, geographical closeness, war, GDP per capita, and population). The
other models are permutations of the baseline where we have added (or deleted) variables.
The models shown in Table 3 add variables for which we have data for the entire sample
period, while the models shown in Table 4 add variables that reduce the sample size
considerably and it is, in these cases, not possible to tell if the baseline results change
because the sample is shortened or because of additional covariate(s). A comparison
between model (1) and model (2) indicates strong duration dependence in the hazard rate.
The Likelihood ratio test reported at the bottom of Table 3 rejects the hypothesis of a
constant hazard rate at the one percent level.
Our measure of the extension of the franchise, su¤rage, is signicant but with a negative
good, the dependent variable is coded zero up to the point of the temporary adoption and then one in
the year of adoption. The country drops out of the data set during the period of the temporary tax and
reenters when it is abolished.
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coe¢ cient in the baseline model. The result is very robust across the di¤erent specications
shown in the two tables and suggests that the extension of the franchise reduced the
likelihood of adopting the income tax. Based on the point estimate from the baseline
model, the odds of adopting the income tax is about 100 percent higher in a society
without elections than in one with universal (male) su¤rage.29 This result is surprising
and a clear rejection of Hypothesis 1. One possible explanation is that the estimate in
the baseline model picks up the e¤ect of elections rather than the e¤ect of the franchise
as such. This would be consistent with the idea that tax innovations are less likely to be
adopted in election years (Hypothesis 3). However, model (3), which adds years to next
election and election year to the baseline specication, allows us to rule this out: neither
of these additional variables are signicant and the coe¢ cient on su¤rage continues to be
negative and highly signicant. Not only does this fail to provide an explanation for the
rejection of Hypothesis 1, it also provides evidence that the election cycle did not exercise
a major inuence on the adoption of the income tax in Western Europe. This stands in
sharp contrast to the evidence reported by Berry and Berry (1992) for U.S. states and
by Ashworth et al. (2006) for Flemish municipalities. Both of these studies found strong
evidence that tax innovations were not adopted in election years. This may indicate that
the election cycle played a less important role in the early days of democracy in Europe
than it does today. In addition and also in contrast to Berry and Berry (1992) and
Ashworth et al. (2006), as model (4) in Table 3 shows, we nd virtually no evidence that
left-wing parties were leading the drive towards income taxation (Hypothesis 2). Not only
is the e¤ect statistically insignicant, the point estimate is negative rather than positive.
Finally, model (4) also shows that the degree of political competition does not seem to
matter much for the likelihood of adopting the income tax.
We nd some evidence that high tax collection costs reduce the probability of adop-
tion (Hypothesis 5). In the baseline model, the cost index has the predicted positive sign
and is signicant at the ten percent level. Based on this estimate, a one point reduction
29The odds ratio is calculated as exp( 0:054  100) = 0:044 where the "100" represents the move from
no elections to universal male su¤rage. The percentage increase in the odds that the income tax will be
adopted following a full extension of the franchise is (exp( 0:054  100)  1)  100 =  99:6:
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in the cost index increases the odds of adoption by more than 300 percent. In models
(5) to (7) in Table 3, we investigate the contribution of the sub-components of the cost
index individually.30 The di¤erent sub-components have conicting e¤ects. Temporary
income tax, which captures mainly wartime income taxes, seems to reduce the probability
of a permanent adoption, while local income tax has a signicant positive and signicant
impact. Education attainment is not close to being signicant. This suggests that experi-
mentation with local income taxes, either at the state or at the municipal level, were the
main driver of the technological innovations that eventually reduced the cost of rolling out
income taxation at a national level. The specication with the alternative measure of tax
collection cost, urbanization, brings further support to Hypothesis 5 as the coe¢ cient on
urbanization is positive and highly signicant in Table 4, model (9).
We also nd evidence of social learning (Hypothesis 4). In the baseline model, geo-
graphical closeness has the predicted positive sign and is signicant at the ve percent
level. The e¤ect is robust across specications using the full data set, but it becomes
insignicant in the specications with a reduced sample reported in Table 4. The variable
geographical closeness only takes into account the learning e¤ects that might arise from
permanent adoptions in other countries. It is, however, possible that neighboring coun-
tries would also learn something from observing temporary adoptions. To allow for this
possibility, we have in model (8) included learning from temporary adoptions. We note
that this variable is insignicant but with a negative sign. If anything this suggests that
the learning experience from permanent and temporary adoptions was very di¤erent. A
specication with the alternative measure of social learning, trade connection, is reported
in Table 4, model (10). We notice that despite the fact that the sample is reduced to 263
observations, the estimate is signicant at the ten percent level. All in all, we interpret
the evidence as being mildly supportive of Hypothesis 4.
The evidence on the role of spending pressures is more mixed. While the dummy
variable war is not statistically signicant in any of the specications reported in Tables
30It is not possible to enter the forth component, census, in the estimations on its own when using
logit. We have estimated the relation using Maximum Penalized likelihood (see note to Table 4) and nd
a positive, but insignicant impact of census.
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3 and 4, it does have the expected positive sign. However, the direct measure of spending
pressures, decit, brings some support to Hypothesis 6: the estimate from model (11) in
Table 4 suggests that a one percentage point increase in the budget decit increases the
odds of adopting the income tax by about 7 percent. Moreover, population has a positive
and signicant impact on the adoption probability in some specications (e.g., model (1)).
Finally, modernization theory (Hypothesis 7) receives no support. GDP per capita
seems to have a negative e¤ect on the adoption probability, albeit an e¤ect that is mostly
insignicant. Age structure does have a signicant impact (model (12) in Table 4), but one
that is negative. In addition to rejecting modernization theory, this result also suggests
that the "grey power" e¤ect that aging populations were one of the key drivers behind
the rise of social spending in the West (Lindert, 1994) was not making it more likely that
income taxation was adopted to nance this expansion.
<Table 3: Logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax permanently,
1815-1941>
<Table 4: Logit (or MPL) estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax
permanently, additional control variables>
5.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
One concern about the (surprising) nding that the extension of the franchise made the
introduction of income taxation less likely is that it may be driven by omitted variables
bias. However, if scal and political reforms were driven by common unobserved prefer-
ence shifts, we would expect that the logit estimate is upwards, not downwards, biased.
Nevertheless, we make an attempt to deal with this concern by taking an instrumental
variables approach. We use two instrumental variables for su¤rage. The rst instrument
is a dummy variable coded one if a revolution or major revolt took place in one of the
11 countries in the sample or elsewhere in Europe in a particular year (revolution). This
variable is motivated by the theoretical model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and is a
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crude attempt to quantify the (perceived) threat of revolution.31 Second, the extension of
the franchise depends on its own past value. This captures the strong path dependency
in the evolution of franchise institutions in Europe. While the rst instrument is clearly
rooted in theory, one might question whether the lagged value of the franchise is uncorre-
lated with any unobserved factor that a¤ects scal reform.32 To implement this strategy,
we estimate a linear probability model with 2SLS.33 The results are reported in Table 5.
<Table 5: 2SLS Linear Probability model and Random E¤ects Logit Model.>
Wemight begin by noting that the J-test does not reject the validity of the instruments.
Thus, if we believe on a priori grounds that revolution is a valid instrument, then we can
interpret this test result as a validation of the lagged value of su¤rage as an instrument.
However, although the two instruments are highly signicant in the rst stage regression
reported in model (13), this is largely driven by the lagged value of su¤rage, and not by
revolution. More importantly, we see that the impact of su¤rage reforms on the probability
of adoption of the income tax continues to be negative and highly signicant (model (14)).
Accordingly, we conclude that the rejection of Hypothesis 1 is unlikely to be a by-product
of omitted variables.
Another concern that one may have about the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 is
that the baseline hazard rate is not allowed to have a country-specic component. To
accommodate this concern, we report in model (15) of Table 5; the results of estimating a
random e¤ects logit model. This specication allows the baseline hazard rate to be a¤ected
by idiosyncratic country-specic shocks. A comparison between the estimates from this
model and those from the baseline model reveals no substantial di¤erences and thus we
believe that the conclusions drawn from the baseline model are robust to allowing for a
heterogenous baseline hazard rate. Further, tests of the null hypothesis of homogeneity do
31For alternative theories of franchise extension see Congleton (2004) or Justman and Gradstein (1999).
32We use lags of three years. Under the assumption that the lagged value of su¤rage is uncorrelated with
the unobserved component of the income tax equation, this procedure produces consistent estimates in
panels with a long time dimension. This, however, requires that the relevant error terms are uncorrelated
over time.
33Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Wooldridge (2002) recommend the use of 2SLS even in cases when
the dependent variable is binary.
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not reject the null.
5.3 Temporary Income taxation and Rare Events Logit
Tax innovations are rare events and the innovations that led to the adoption of the income
tax in Europe were spread out over almost 100 years. This is what makes it challenging
to estimate the causes of these adoptions. To rise to this challenge, we have explored two
alternative routes. Firstly, we have increased the number of events by including temporary
as well as permanent adoptions in the analysis. While the advantage of this is more events,
the downside is that it is unclear if the decisions that led to a temporary adoption were of
the same nature as those that led to a permanent adoption. For example, as is clear from
Table 1, many temporary adoptions had to do with involvement in wars. On the other
hand, when the income tax was introduced in United Kingdom in 1842, it was intended as
a temporary measure and was subject to an annual vote, yet it lingered on and e¤ectively
became a permanent feature of the tax system. The results of the estimations with all
income tax adoptions, temporary or permanent, are reported in Table 6 (which has a
layout similar to that of Table 3). The results are very similar to those reported in Table
3 with two exceptions. First, there is less evidence of duration dependence and, in fact,
we cannot in some of the specications reject that the hazard rate is constant. Secondly,
spending pressures as measured by the variable war are now highly signicant. This is not
surprising as many of the temporary income tax adoption in the sample can be attributed
directly to war.
Secondly, it is well-known that the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters
of a logit model are biased in small samples (less than 200 observations). While our
sample has more than 600 observations, we are concerned that whatever bias there is, it is
amplied by the fact that tax adoptions are rare events.34 We therefore need to take the
possibility of a systematic downwards bias seriously. King and Zeng (2001) has developed
an estimator that corrects for this bias. It also improves the e¢ ciency of the estimates.
We have re-run our estimations using this estimator and report a subset of the results in
34Tax adoptions constitute less than two percent of our cases.
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Table 7. We show four specications, two with permanent adoptions only and two with
temporary or permanent adoptions. We continue to nd that su¤rage reforms reduced
and tax innovations (measured either by cost index or by local income taxes) increased
the adoption probability. However, in these estimations the evidence of social learning is
weaker than before. The coe¢ cient on geographical closeness is mostly insignicant albeit
positive. In short, although the estimated coe¢ cient on su¤rage is numerically smaller
that in the baseline model, the results reported in Table 7 allow us to rule out that the
puzzling e¤ect of su¤rage reforms is caused by "rare events" bias.
<Table 6: Logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax temporary or
permanently, 1815-1941>
<Table 7: Rare events logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax,
1815-1941>
5.4 A Five Percent Threshold
Above we have addressed the question of what determines the introduction of the income,
irrespective of whether the tax became a major revenue source or not. As indicated by
Table 1, the income tax, in fact, did reach reasonably high yields soon after its introduction
in most countries, but with Austria being a notable exception. Motivated by this, we want
to ask a slightly di¤erent question in this section: what determined whether or not a
country reached a given yield threshold, conditional on having adopted the income tax?
We have experimented with di¤erent thresholds. We report the results from estimations
using a ve percent threshold in Table 8.35 We note that su¤rage reforms not only reduced
the probability that the income tax was introduced, but also reduced the probability that
once it was there, the yields hit the ve percent threshold. Tax collection technology and
social learning, on the other hand, did not play an major role. The latter result is perhaps
not all that surprising as one would expect that the signal emitted by a country that
35The ve percent threshold assumes that a country has not adopted the income until it yields at least
ve percent of total tax revenues (see Table 1). The dependent variable is coded accordingly.
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adopts a new tax is much stronger than the signal emitted when a certain yield threshold
is reached.
<Table 8: Logit estimates of the probability of reaching a yield of at least ve percent,
1815-1942>
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have estimated the conditional probability that a country adopts the income tax for a
sample of 11Western European countries. We nd evidence that social learning, reductions
in tax collection costs and to a lesser extent spending pressures played a signicant role
for the adoption decision. Surprisingly, we also nd evidence that the extension of the
franchise reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax. Our analysis suggests that
this puzzling e¤ect is unlikely to be caused by confusion between election year e¤ects and
the e¤ect of franchise reforms or be due to omitted variables or to rare events bias.
We can o¤er one tentative explanation that might help resolve the puzzle. The elites
that extended the franchise in Western Europe accepted that the poor could vote, but at
the same time they introduced new or enhanced old checks and balances that prevented or
delayed large scale Robin Hood type redistribution.36 For example, it was common practice
to have two legislative chambers and legislation either needed approval of both or could
be blocked by the upper chamber. By maintaining control over the upper chamber, while
widening the franchise for the lower, the elites e¤ectively put constitutional constraints
on the extent of redistribution. This may have delayed the adoption of the income tax
for two reasons. Firstly, it was less attractive as a tool of redistribution. Secondly, its
value as a revenue raiser was reduced by the fact that large scale expansion of spending
programs favored by the newly enfranchised voters were blocked. This interpretation is
consistent with other available evidence. Aidt et al. (2006) report that the franchise
extension in Western Europe did not lead to a large and immediate expansion of total
government spending, but shifted the portfolio of spending. This observation supports
36See Breyer and Ursprung (1998) for a theoretical model along these lines.
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the view that income taxation as a revenue raiser might have been limited at the time of
franchise extension.
7 Data Appendix
Construction of the event history data sets We use two data sets in the analysis.
The complete data set contains information on su¤rage, left-wing parties, political compe-
tition, election year, years to next election, cost index (and its constituents), geographical
closeness, GDP per capita, population, learning from temporary adoptions and war for all
11 countries from 1815 (or the time of independence) to the time when the income tax was
adopted. For su¤rage and left-wing parties data are only recorded in election years. In
o¤-election years, we have no data. For su¤rage, we have made the assumption that the
variable stayed constant between elections, something which is obviously true for left-wing
partiesshare of seats. Both variables are coded zero for periods without democracy and
elections of any sort. The incomplete data set (or sets) contains four additional variables
(urbanization, trade connection, decit and age structure) which cannot be tracked back
to 1815 (or time of independence). In addition to this, for some of the variables in the in-
complete data set, the original data contains gaps for the time span they do cover. In these
cases, we have interpolated the missing observations linearly. Linear interpolation seems
a reasonable solution, although more sophisticated methods are available. Little (1992)
suggests, for example, to use predicted values from least squares regressions in which the
other explanatory variables available in the data set are used as regressors to ll in the
gaps. For most variables, we, however, have too few observations to make this a sensible
procedure and we did not pursue this alternative.
Data sources The data on the extension of the franchise are from Flora et al. (1983)
and Cook and Paxton (1998). The data on the share of seats held by left-wing parties is
constructed from Caramani (2000) and Flora et al. (1983). The source of the polity IV
index is Marshall and Jaggers (2000). The data on urbanization, educational attainment,
population size and age structure come from Flora et al. (1983), Mitchell (1998), Vanhanen
(2003) and Maddison (1991, 2003). Tax and public spending data are from Flora et
al. (1983) and Mitchell (1998). The data on real GDP at international prices are from
Maddison (2003). Trade and distance data are from Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2005).
Data on the existence of a population census come from Flora et al. (1983). The sources
used to date the adoption of the income tax are listed below for each country.
1. Denmark (Sample period: 1815-1903). A tax on earned income was introduced per-
manently in 1903 after the so-called "system change" in 1901 where the peasants
party nally took hold of government. This date is conrmed by Webber and Wil-
davsky (1986), Peters (1991, p. 230), Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, Vol. XIV
p.357), Philip (1965, chapter 9) and the National Danish Encyclopaedia (1998, Vol.
9). The rst temporary income tax was levied in 1789. Other temporary incomes
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taxes were levied in 1809, 1848-50, 1864, and in 1867-70. In 1803, a sort of income
tax at the municipal level (on wealth) was introduced. However, the rst proper tax
on earned income at the municipal level was the income tax levied in Copenhagen
from 1861 (Philip, 1965, chapter 9).
2. Sweden (Sample period: 1815-1902). We date the introduction of the income tax to
1902 when a progressive income tax with self-declaration was adopted. This dating is
supported by Philip (1965, chapter 9), Nationalencyclopedin (1995), Messere (1998,
p. 328). Webber and Wildavsky (1986, p. 344), however, put the date as 1897 and
this is repeated by Peters (1991, p. 320), but this seems to be a mistake that can
be traced back to Seligman (1911). During the Napoleonic Wars an income tax was
introduced in 1809-10 but given up in 1812 because of low yields. Although local
taxes on property were widely used from 1843 onwards, it was not until 1920 that
the municipalities levied a proper income tax (Svensk Uppslagsbok, 1953, Vol. 14).
3. Norway (Sample period: 1815-1892). At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Dano-
Norwegian Oldenburg king was forced to cede Norway to the King of Sweden. Nor-
way took this opportunity to declare independence, adopted a constitution based
on American and French models but was soon after forced into a personal union
with Sweden. Under this arrangement, Norway kept its liberal constitution and in-
dependent institutions, except for the foreign service. Philip (1965, p. 123) dates
the introduction of the income tax in Norway to 1892; a date which is conrmed
by Store Norske Leksikon (1999) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, Vol. XIV, p.
358). Webber and Wildavsky (1986) and following them Peters (1991, Table 7.1)
report that the income tax was introduced in 1905, but this date corresponds to the
introduction of progressive income taxation. From 1882 an income tax was levied by
the local authorities (kommune) and the modern income tax can be traced back to
the Napoleonic Wars when a temporary tax on income was imposed (Store Norske
Leksikon, 1999).
4. Italy (Sample period: 1861-1864). The income tax (imposte e reddito) in Italy was
introduced three years after unication, i.e., in 1864, and followed the British model
of schedules (Seligman, 1911, p. 340; Webber and Wildavsky 1986; Peters, 1991,
Table 7.1; Enciclopedia Italiana, 1937, Vol. XVIII). The tax code was amended in
1866, 1867, 1870, 1873, 1874, 1877, 1894 and 1907. The income tax, introduced in
1864, unied all taxes on mobile wealth from the old states, where mobile wealth
meant that "the tax was imposed upon all incomes except those subject to the real
estate tax and excepting also the income from government securities" (Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1937).
5. Germany (German Empire (1871-1918) and Weimar Republic (191933)) (Sample
period: 1871-1920). The rst federal income tax was introduced in 1920. Before then
only the states could levy income taxes. During the Napoleonic Wars some of the
states including Prussia in 1808 introduced a temporary income tax. State income
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taxes were introduced on a permanent basis in Prussia in 1851, in Hessen in 1869,
in Sachsen in 1874, and in Baden in 1884 (Philip, 1965, p. 122; Seligman, 1911, p.
233¤; Webber and Wildavsky, 1986; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911).
6. Austrian Empire (Sample period 1815-1849). The Austrian Empire (German: Kaiser-
tum Österreich) o¢ cially lasted from 1804 to 1867, followed by the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. It was a monarchy with no elections. The personal income tax was intro-
duced permanently in 1849 (originally envisaged as a temporary measure) after the
revolution in 1848. Groschen (1872, p. 45) reports that the yields from the (imperial)
income tax was an inappreciable item in the years following its adoption. Temporary
attempts at an income tax were noted in 1743 and again in the war taxes of 1778,
1789 and 1790 (Seligman, 1932, vol. VII; Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 344;
Peters, 1991, Table 7.1; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911, Vol. XIV, p. 357). It was
not possible to establish for sure if there were any local income taxation in Austria
before 1849, but the detailed discussion in Sieghart (1898) suggests that this was not
the case. We code the local income tax dummy as zero from 1815 to 1849.
7. Netherlands (Sample period 1830-1993). At the congress of Vienna, Holland and
Austrian Belgium were united to the Kingdom of Holland. However, Belgium de-
clared its independence in 1830, and we treat the two as independent states from
1830 onwards. The income tax became a permanent feature of the tax system in
1893 when a tax on income from business and professions (belasting op bedrijf en
beroep) was introduced (Seligman, 1932, Vol. VII). The year before a tax on wealth
had been introduced and the income tax is sometimes thus dated (e.g., Peters, 1991,
chapter 7). The origins of the income tax can be traced back to 1797 when some-
thing like an income tax was temporarily introduced (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986,
p. 337). Stuart (1898) indicates that "several years before [the national income tax
was levied] a great many communes levied already income-taxes" (p. 325). However,
no precise date is given and it appears that the tax in question was a kind of poll
tax in which the tax per head depended on wealth rather than on income tax as
such (Fritschy, 1997). We have coded the local income tax dummy zero for the years
before 1893.
8. Belgium (Sample period: 1830-1922). Belgium became independent in 1830 (see
notes for the Netherlands). The income tax was rst introduced in 1922 (Peters,
1991, Table 7.1). The discussion in Goschen (1872, p. 44) suggests that there was
no local (province, canton or commune level) income taxes in 1870. There are no
mentioning of any income taxes, national or local, in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911)
or other sources. We, therefore, assume that no such taxes existed before 1922. The
origins of the income tax can be traced back to 1797 when something like an income
tax was temporarily introduced (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 337).
9. Switzerland (Sample Period: 1848-1941). At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in
1815, the independence of the 22 Swiss Cantons was guaranteed. However, it was not
27
until 1848 that a federation/central government was established. Although income
taxation at the Canton level has a long history in Switzerland, it was not until 1941
that a permanent federal income tax was introduced (Flora et al., 1983). Temporary
income taxes (on war prots) were introduced in 1915-19 and in 1934 (The Schweizer
Lexikon, 1946, Vol. II; Der Grosse Brockhaus, 1954). The rst Canton to adopt
income taxation was Baselstadt in 1840 (Seligman, 1932; Webber and Wildavsky,
1986, p. 344; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911, Vol. XIV, p. 358).
10. France (Sample period: 1815-1911). Throughout the nineteenth century repeated
attempts were made to introduce the income tax. They all failed and it was not
until 1911 that an income tax law was nally approved by the Senate (Seligman,
1911, chapter 2; Philip, 1965, chapter 7; Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 344).
Peters (1991, Table 7.1) dates the income tax to 1909 but this was the year in which
the tax bill was approved by the lower house and referred to the Senate. It appears,
however, that it was not until 1914 that the legislation came into force and some
sources date the French income tax to 1914 (e.g., Flora et al., 1983). We date the
adoption of the income tax to 1911 when the relevant legislation was approved by
the Senate, rather than to 1914/16 where revenues started to come in. A general
income tax (the so-called compulsory loan) was introduced temporarily in 1793 as
a sporadic war measure. Although various proxy income taxes, such as doors and
windows taxes, were widespread throughout the 19th century, there appears not to
have been any local income taxes before 1911. For a comprehensive discussion of the
early attempts of income taxation in France, see Willis (1895).
11. The United Kingdom (Sample period: 1815-1842). The income tax, based on the
schedule system, became a permanent feature of the tax system in 1842 (e.g., Daun-
ton, 2001, Sabine, 1966). Income taxes had previously been used temporary during
the Napoleonic Wars (1798-1802; 1803-1816). Incomes were not taxed at the local
level before 1842 (or after).
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Table 1: The timing of the income tax in Western Europe. 
Country Permanent 
Income 
 Tax from 















1849 1778, 1789-90 Noned 1905 
Italy 1864 None <1861a 1877 
Norway 1892 1809 1882 1892 
Netherlands 1893 1797 None 1899 
Sweden 1902 1809-12 1920 1903 
Denmark 1903 1789, 1809, 1848-50, 
1864, 1867-70 
1861 1917e 
France 1911 1793 Noned 1918 
Germanyc  1920 1808 1851b 1924 
Belgium 1922 1797 Noned 1922 
Switzerland 1941 1915-19, 1934 1840 1942 
Notes: a. Income taxes levied by some of the old states before unification in 1861. b. Prussia 
introduced the income tax in 1851, followed by Hessen in 1869. c. German Empire (1871-1918) 
and Weimar Republic (1919–33). d. We could find no indication in the literature that local and/or 
state income taxes were used before the introduction of the national income tax. e. the threshold 
for Denmark was most likely reached before 1917. f. Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867. 
Sources: See Data Appendix. 
 




1) The electorate (for parliamentary elections) in percentage of the 
enfranchised age and sex group, before women’s suffrage, male 
population only (suffrage) 
2) The share of seats held by left-wing parties in the lower chamber of 
parliament (left-wing parties) 
3) Dummy variable equal to 1 in election years (election year) 
4) The number of years until the next election (years to next election). 








jdistij tACL ij )(
1  
where distij is distance between the capitals of country i and j. ( )jA t = 1 
if country j adopted the income tax in year tτ ≤ , and is 0 otherwise. 
 
2) Trade connection is defined as  
( ) ( )it ij j
j
TC T t A t= ∑  
where ( )ijT t is the volume of trade between country i and j in year t as a 
percentage of GDP in country i. 
3) Learning from temporary adoptions is defined as geographical 
closeness, except that Aj(t)=1 if country j has a temporary income tax in 
year t and zero otherwise. 
Tax collection 
cost (T) 
1) Cost index is the sum of 
 
• census (dummy variable coded 1 in year t if the country had a 
population census at some t≤τ  and 0 otherwise). 
• temporary income tax (dummy variable coded 1 if the country at some 
point in the past had introduced a temporary income tax and the tax was 
later abolished and 0 otherwise). 
• local income tax (dummy variable coded 1 for the years after which a 
country started to levy income tax at the local, state or regional level and 
0 otherwise). 
• education attainment (dummy variable coded 1 for the years after which 
enrollment in primary education as a percentage of all 5 to 14 years olds 
reached 60 per cent and 0 otherwise). 
 
2) Urbanization measured as the percentage of the population living in 




1) A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country was at war in year t and equal 
to 0 otherwise (war) 
2) GDP per capita at 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (GDP per 
capita). 
3) The size of the total population in 1,000s (population). 
4) The percentage of the population above 65 years of age (age structure).  
5) The percentage difference between total (central) government spending 
and total (central) government tax revenues, lagged one year (deficit). 
Notes: The sources are listed in the Data Appendix. 
 
Table 3: Logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax permanently, 1815-1941 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Suffrage -0.054** -0.025 -0.056** -0.057* -0.061*** -0.041** -0.053** -0.054** 
 [-2.44] [-1.59] [-2.43] [-1.89] [-2.66] [-2.12] [-2.28] [-2.43] 
Cost index 1.472* 0.728 1.467* 1.636    1.476* 
 [1.69] [1.04] [1.65] [1.28]    [1.69] 
Geographical closeness 146.00** 88.97*** 150.80** 147.20* 124.40 151.10** 136.60 145.60**
 [1.99] [2.72] [2.03] [1.95] [1.38] [2.09] [1.59] [1.99] 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.78 0.60 -1.61 -2.17 -1.36 -0.86 0.50 -1.73 
 [-0.94] [0.50] [-0.83] [-0.78] [-0.69] [-0.51] [0.27] [-0.92] 
Log(population) 0.737* 0.27 0.822 0.728 0.963** 0.557 0.878* 0.718 
 [1.65] [0.77] [1.60] [1.58] [2.09] [1.30] [1.75] [1.61] 
War  1.214 0.953 1.232 1.262 1.767 0.789 1.31 1.233 
 [0.93] [0.82] [0.93] [0.94] [1.26] [0.63] [0.98] [0.94] 
Election year   0.326      
   [0.41]      
Years to next election   0.025      
   [0.42]      
Left-wing parties    -0.003     
    [-0.072]     
Political competition    0.032     
    [0.20]     
Local income tax     2.619**    
     [2.36]    
Education attainment      0.782   
      [0.56]   
Temporary income tax       -2.502  
       [-1.57]  
Learning from temp. 
adoptions         
-4.508 
        [-0.19] 
Years without income tax 0.246  0.241 0.251 0.327 0.228 0.341 0.243 
 [1.32]  [1.31] [1.30] [1.47] [1.25] [1.45] [1.31] 
Spline(1) 0.00026  0.00025 0.00027 0.00028* 0.00022 0.00032* 0.00026 
 [1.64]  [1.54] [1.59] [1.65] [1.50] [1.72] [1.62] 
Spline(2) -0.00018*  -0.00017* -0.00019* -0.00020* -0.00015* -0.00021* -0.00018*
 [-1.83]  [-1.70] [-1.76] [-1.83] [-1.68] [-1.90] [-1.81] 
Constant -4.820 -12.920 -7.174 -2.131 -9.001 -7.026 -19.620 -4.940 
 [-0.34] [-1.23] [-0.46] [-0.11] [-0.65] [-0.53] [-1.27] [-0.35] 
Observations 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 
LR χ2(3) test for constant hazard  16.05***       
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 4: Logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax permanently, additional 
control variables. 
Model 9 10 11 12 
     
Suffrage -0.186*** -0.017 -0.065** -0.084*** 
 [-2.94] [-0.98] [-2.40] [-2.67] 
Cost index 4.808*** 0.689 1.000 2.193** 
 [2.79] [0.70] [1.23] [2.10] 
Geographical closeness -30.562 -0.901 74.210 52.901 
 [-0.45] [-0.59] [0.95] [1.00] 
Log(GDP per capita) -5.873** 0.401 -2.667 -0.543 
 [-2.42] [0.78] [-1.11] [-0.34] 
Log(population) 0.1302 0.4041 0.561 1.5744** 
 [0.25] [0.78] [1.07] [2.54] 
War  -2.099 3.237 0.663 -0.514 
 [-1.17] [1.62] [0.40] [-0.31] 
Urbanization 0.534***    
 [2.95]    
Trade connection  9.384*   
  [1.74]   
Deficit   0.067**  
   [2.54]  
Age structure    -1.983** 
    [-2.56] 
Years without income tax -0.354 0.09 0.201 0.130 
 [-2.04] [0.60] [1.07] [1.03] 
Spline(1) 0 0.0001 0.000233 0.0002 
 [-0.24] [0.97] [1.40] [1.42] 
Spline(2) -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00018* -0.0002* 
 [-0.76] [-1.17] [-1.73] [-1.95] 
Constant 26.201 -4.144 4.54 -10.126 
 [1.53] [-0.32] [0.26] [-0.81] 
Observations 345 263 517 490 
 Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Models (9), (10) and (12) have been estimated using Maximum Penalized Likelihood (MPL). When using Logit 
estimation, Stata drops the variable war, because some outcomes are predicted perfectly by this variable. Zorn (2005) 
refers to such a situation as ‘separation’ and recommends the use of MPL as the best defence against bias. We note 
that it matters little for the results to use this alternative estimation method.  Because of missing data, we lose Austria, 
the Netherlands and UK, when estimating Model (9). With model (10) we lose Austria, Italy and the UK. When 
estimating model (12), we lose Austria. 
Table 5: 2SLS Linear Probability model and Random Effects Logit Model. 
Model 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Dependent variable Suffrage Permanent income tax Suffrage Permanent or temp. income tax 
       
Suffrage  -0.00069** -0.054**  -0.00069** -0.028* 
  [-2.10] [-2.44]  [-2.10] [-1.67] 
Revolution 1.842   1.921   
 [0.86]   [0.96]   
Suffrage lagged three years 0.924***   0.945***   
 [37.8]   [42.5]   
Cost index 0.091 0.010 1.472* -0.462 0.016 1.159 
 [0.11] [0.98] [1.69] [-0.51] [1.39] [1.60] 
Geographical closeness 254.400 6.998 146.000** 228.600 7.824 97.840** 
 [1.57] [1.29] [1.99] [1.52] [1.52] [2.17] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.279 -0.077 -1.779 0.727 -0.056 0.143 
 [-0.19] [-1.30] [-0.94] [0.50] [-0.94] [0.095] 
Log(population) 0.750 0.006 0.737* 1.030** -0.005 -0.270 
 [1.50] [1.15] [1.65] [2.34] [-0.66] [-0.70] 
War  7.857 0.019 1.214 1.336 0.122 2.283** 
 [1.42] [0.37] [0.93] [0.39] [1.33] [2.55] 
Years without income tax 0.036 0.00078 0.246 -0.087 -0.00038 0.049 
 [0.31] [0.41] [1.32] [-1.29] [-0.16] [0.56] 
Spline(1) -0.000066 0.0000018 0.00026 -0.00016 0.0000015 0.00012 
 [-0.52] [0.70] [1.64] [-1.55] [0.44] [0.96] 
Spline(2) 0.000066 -0.0000016 -0.00018* 0.000089 -0.0000013 -0.000078 
 [0.76] [-0.86] [-1.83] [1.63] [-0.67] [-1.17] 
Constant -3.689 0.495 -4.819 -10.94 0.442 -5.988 
 [-0.34] [1.16] [-0.34] [-0.99] [1.05] [-0.48] 
Observations 632 632 642 618 618 628 
      
F-stat for exclusion of instruments 728.06***   923.06***   
J-statistic (p-value)  0.231   0.222  
Estimation technique 2SLS:  first stage 
2SLS: 




second stage RE logit 
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 2SLS model is a 
linear probability model. The J-statistic reports the p-value of a Hansen test of validity of over-identifying restrictions.
Table 6: Logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax temporary or permanently, 
1815-1941. 
Model 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Suffrage -0.024* -0.016 -0.026** -0.031* -0.051*** -0.0096 -0.013 -0.044**
 [-1.77] [-1.36] [-1.97] [-1.66] [-2.73] [-0.79] [-1.13] [-2.25] 
Cost index 1.246* 0.922 1.147* 1.472*    1.534* 
 [1.92] [1.54] [1.82] [1.89]    [1.94] 
Geographical closeness 94.300** 101.400*** 89.330** 91.110** 31.060 85.930** 70.290 116.800**
 [2.23] [2.92] [2.14] [2.09] [0.71] [2.13] [1.53] [2.28] 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.324 -0.295 -0.291 -0.989 2.331* 0.64 1.069 0.569 
 [-0.30] [-0.30] [-0.28] [-0.68] [1.90] [0.64] [0.90] [0.38] 
Log(population) -0.347 -0.423 -0.344 -0.39 0.0722 -0.249 -0.164 0.321 
 [-1.06] [-1.33] [-1.11] [-1.12] [0.23] [-0.81] [-0.49] [0.77] 
War  2.129** 2.289*** 2.281*** 2.163** 3.120*** 1.957** 2.174** 0.217 
 [2.54] [2.89] [2.68] [2.54] [3.33] [2.29] [2.39] [0.14] 
Election year   0.076      
   [0.11]      
Years to next election   -0.045      
   [-0.86]      
Left-wing parties    0.02     
    [0.50]     
Political competition    0.041     
    [0.47]     
Local income tax     3.638***    
     [3.26]    
Education attainment      -0.101   
      [-0.10]   
Temporary income tax       -0.645  
       [-0.67]  
Learning from temp. ad.        224.400 
        [0.60] 
Years without income tax 0.0489  0.0586 0.0489 0.145 0.0358 0.0408 0.142 
 [0.59]  [0.70] [0.57] [1.38] [0.42] [0.47] [1.05] 
Spline(1) 0.00012  0.00015 0.00012 0.00030** 0.0001 0.00012 0.00024 
 [1.04]  [1.22] [0.94] [1.98] [0.86] [1.02] [1.37] 
Spline(2) -0.00003  -0.00009 -0.00007 -0.00017** -0.00006 -0.000079 -0.00014
 [-1.22]  [-1.41] [-1.09] [-2.22] [-1.04] [-1.21] [-1.54] 
Constant -1.851 -0.595 -1.506 3.221 -23.630** -7.030 -10.250 -16.500 
 [-0.21] [-0.07] [-0.18] [0.28] [-2.15] [-0.83] [-1.06] [-1.23] 
Observations 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 
LR χ2(3) test for constant hazard  4.07       
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The p-value for the 
LR test is 0.25. 
Table 7: Rare events logit estimates of the probability of adopting the income tax, 1815-1941. 
Model 27 28 29 30 
Dependent variable Permanent income tax adoptions 
Permanent and temporary 
income tax adoptions 
     
Suffrage -0.045** -0.051** -0.021* -0.046* 
 [-2.03] [-2.31] [-1.66] [-1.88] 
Cost index 1.291*  1.148**  
 [1.77]  [2.04]  
Geographical closeness 112.900 92.240 90.150* 27.190 
 [1.61] [0.88] [1.77] [0.60] 
Log(GDP per capita) -1.410 -1.006 -0.419 2.073 
 [-0.64] [-0.40] [-0.34] [1.44] 
Log(population) 0.644 0.830** -0.263 0.117 
 [1.31] [2.12] [-0.59] [0.34] 
War  1.455 1.995 2.048* 2.991** 
 [0.87] [0.98] [1.73] [2.36] 
Local income tax  2.274*  3.397*** 
  [1.67]  [2.69] 
Years without income tax 0.162 0.231 0.0319 0.114 
 [1.02] [1.00] [0.35] [0.79] 
Spline(1) 0.00019 0.00022 0.000099 0.00026 
 [1.20] [1.05] [0.73] [1.21] 
Spline(2) -0.00014 -0.00016 -0.000066 -0.00016 
 [-1.30] [-1.13] [-0.87] [-1.38] 
Constant -4.208 -7.934 -1.122 -21.390 
 [-0.25] [-0.49] [-0.10] [-1.59] 
Observations 642 642 628 628 
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are 
corrected for rare events bias as suggested by King and Zeng (2001).  
Table 8: Logit estimates of the probability of reaching a yield of at least five percent, 1815-1942. 
Model 31 32 33 34 35a 
Suffrage -0.048** -0.021 -0.058* -0.044* -0.041* 
 [-2.08] [-1.31] [-1.81] [-1.95] [-1.65] 
Cost index 0.069 0.878 0.367 0.166 -0.018 
 [0.10] [1.29] [0.40] [0.22] [-0.03] 
Geographical closeness 6.314 58.620** 7.290 5.081 15.010 
 [0.15] [1.96] [0.17] [0.12] [0.28] 
Ln(GDP per capita) -4.040* 1.205 -4.675** -4.338** -3.577 
 [-1.92] [0.92] [-2.00] [-1.97] [-1.25] 
Ln(population) 0.598 0.281 0.544 0.562 0.510 
 [1.30] [0.76] [1.13] [1.20] [0.88] 
War  -0.400 0.922 -0.376 -0.646 -0.024 
 [-0.30] [0.79] [-0.27] [-0.47] [-0.03] 
Election year    -1.551  
    [-1.36]  
Years to next election    -0.093  
    [-0.55]  
Left-wing parties   0.007   
   [0.12]   
Political competition   0.081   
   [0.56]   
Years without income tax 0.032  0.023 0.019 -0.092 
 [0.17]  [0.12] [0.10] [-0.62] 
Spline(1) -0.000017  -0.000023 -0.000016 -0.00006 
 [-0.17]  [-0.24] [-0.16] [-0.57] 
Spline(2) -0.0000018  0.0000027 -0.0000033 0.000021 
 [-0.03]  [0.05] [-0.06] [0.32] 
Constant 17.140 -18.390 22.310 20.570 18.900 
 [1.00] [-1.59] [1.18] [1.14] [0.78] 
Estimation method ML ML ML ML Rare Events 
Observations 746 746 746 746 746 
LR χ2(3) test for constant hazard  15.25***    
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. a. robust z statistics 
(see note to Table 7). 
 
